Costa Concordia, 80 deg list, really scary !!

QUOTE J .E .H

These ships are as about as safe as traveling gets

you can fool your self

 

Capsize in a sudden

There has been an event on 28th of October 2008 about 03 pm German Time westward Gedser, Baltic Sea, when a vessel capsized very quickly to port without any known reason - as was told by crew of the Russian cargo "Sormovsky" nearby and three survivers of crew:

80-m 1984-built Slovakian freighter M/V Omer N (IMO 8131154), en route to Nantes, France with 11 crew, capsized off Fehmarn, 15 miles west of Gedser, location N 54°29.894' / E 11°31.974' on Oct. 28. The cause of the incident is undetermined but not weather related. The vessel is laying on its side, but still afloat. Rescue efforts launched included helicopter and vessels Sormovskiy 50 (Russan cargo M/V) Arkona (German SAR) Berlin (German SAR) Elsa (German SAR) Emil Zimmermann (German SAR) John T. Essberger (German SAR) LW Dam (Danish SAR) Neustrelitz (German coast guard). One crew man of M/V Omer N is reported dead. Several crew members are missing and believed to be trapped in the wreckage. The wreck is expected to ground east of Rødby. The German emergency tug Fairplay 26 and the multi purpose ship Scharhoern were called by the "Havariekommando" and are expected on scene shortly. Divers were deployed for rescue attempts. From our Sr. Correspondent Tim Schwabedissen (Sun. Oct. 28 2007)

Source: http://www.cargolaw.com/presentation_casualties.07.html#Oct-07

One day later it was reported, that nobody knew the reason for this capsizing in fair weather and sea conditions and that 3 survivors (picked up by "Sormovsky") said, the other 8 of crew could not escape the cabins or rooms they were in because of that quick movement of the capsized vessel ...

Source: http://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article1310797/Taucher_bergen_vier_Leichen_aus_Frachter.html

Since I lived not far away of Fehmarn-Belt at that time, I tried to follow-up the news about this accident, which after 31. of October with a sudden stop: now news anymore in the media, no reports about salvage, no reports about the dead, no reports about a law-case or anything like that. If you search "Omer N" now, you will not find much more ... One day later Danish TV had reported, that those three survivors had been taken on airplane to their homes in Turkey...

We all at the port of Neustadt wanted to know, what had happened, but there were no answers by people belonging to Coast Guard or "Havariekommando"...
So my question to the experts here is: HOW can a vessel capsize as quickly as "Omer N" did? Is this possible without any influence from "outside"?

(additional pics attached

 

Not that I would ever take a cruise ship anywhere, because they are rife with disease, drugs, murder, ****, robbery, stupidity, etc. But those are all brought about by people, not the inherient design or engineering of the vessel. Over all, the design and construction of cruise ships makes them much safer than a car, train, or airplane. They are far safer than most buildings of equal mass.

What most of the people in this thread seem to miss is that the design, engineering, and construction of the ship (or a building for that matter) must save people when everything else: all legislation, operator training, and human and environmental factors; has deserted them. In that the Costa Concordia herself, all the features designed and built into her, did admirably. This casualty was not a call to action to change design and regulatory requirements of the ship, but rather a thought provoking item about how many lives is society willing to put in a few mens hands, and what selection process should we use for them. Men killed the people on the Costa Concordia, but it wasn't the engineers, designers, builders, or regulators of this ship.

 

Goog argument....

But: sometimes it IS the ships, as is described her:

The Tankship Tromedy
The Impending Disasters in
Tankers
Second Edition
(Section on Inerting re-written 2010-01)
(Section on early Class History re-written 2010-03)]

http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/tromedy2.pdf

 

One wonders what would be said about an airliner pilot buzzing his crew's home town so they can wave at Mom. it would only have to happen once anywhere in the World to trigger an almighty media frenzy, but it seems to be routine for cruise ships, carrying more than ten times as many passengers, to do this, and not a word is said until one misses the shore by a negative amount.

 

There still was large amount of luck involwed.
Weather was calm.
Wind pushed the ship back to shore where it came to rest on the seabed and couldn't capsize and sink completely. Many people were able to swim to nearby shore or take shelter on unsubmerged part of the ship because of that.

Would longnitudal watertight bulkheads some 3 m from the outer hull with crossflooding pipes to keep floding balanced helped?
Watertight deck to keep water from rising into upper decks.
Higher freeboard to give more reserve floatation capability.
Fortified engine rooms. If main generators are operational water can be pumped out and even fatally damaged ship kept afloat as long as pumps can stay ahead of flooding.

From what I have learned warships have some of those features so technicaly it can be done.
I think it is a big gamble to think that always when ship gets seriously damaged evacuation will be possible. What if there is a storm? Throw in poorly trained panicked crew and you have recipe for massive disaster.

 

I would like to thank you for a very good summary of the importance of this particular incident for the future. Let us hope that all IMO member states and the Mediterranean nations in particular take these lessons on board.

 

Was it really good luck that the C C was blown onto land? If it had stayed off the rocks might it have settled without listing so much and not trapped people in their cabins and disabled lifeboat operations?
Maybe time will tell.

 

To answer some of your questions:

Longitudinal Bulkheads are no solution for ships of this type and require permanently open cross connections to guarantee against capsize. One of the errors is to assume that a bulkhead 3m or more inboard from the ship's side will never be penetrated - maybe not by the rock in this instance, but definitely by the bulbous bow of another vessel (as in the case of the Andrea Doria/Stockholm incident).

The only deck which should be watertight is the Bulkhead Deck as every effort must be made to ensure that this deck is not immersed in the most serious of incidents - and that may require a possible increase in freeboard to increase reserve buoyancy. Any other watertight decks can lead to the build up of extra free surfaces during flooding which will rapidly destroy stability.

There is no practical way to fortify engine rooms - the best that can be done is to distribute machinery in a number of discete watertight compartments - although as we see in this case that is no guarantee either! Do not think that in this case pumps would have been any good when you see the size of the opening to the sea.

When a ship is damaged, it is the intention of the SOLAS regulations to ensure that it will remain afloat, upright (if possible), and if doomed to sink due to the extent of flooding (generally more than two or three adjacent compartments) to remain afloat for long enough to evacuate the passengers into lifeboats and liferafts. If the sea is rough this becomes much more difficult and some masters may elect to beach their vessel to save their passengers. The beaching in this case was not ideal as there was no power to drive the ship up a beach on which it might ground and remain stable. Grounding parallel to a beach is always likely to lead to capsize.

You should note that few warships have any better survivability than the Costa Concordia to long raking damage. They are designed in general to have a larger number of discrete watertight compartments which may allow them to survive a larger number of relatively small hull breaches. They also tend to have relatively thin shell plating these days as they are mostly lightweight structures - no longer dependent on armour plating.

As stated elsewhere, this disaster appears almost entirely the result of human failings - not technical saftey issues.

 

Terror at sea - the sinking of the concordia

This might be worth watching:

http://www.channel4.com/programmes/terror-at-sea-the-sinking-of-the-concordia

 

I respect every opinion, and also yours.
We have seen:
- A struggle against a rock has led to a fatal flooding.
- The behavior of the boat because of the center of gravity.
- The situation of the boats.

All this, in almost any port, with a flat sea, a gentle breeze.

Frankly, I have no comments.

PS

QUOTE
Not that I would ever take a cruise ship anywhere, because they are rife with disease, drugs, murder, ****, robbery, stupidity, etc
QUOTE

I honestly do not know where you've seen what you talk about a cruise, particularly low-cost cruise , as those offered on Costa Ships.

Usually they are for young families with children and for old pensioners.

It's possible that one day I convinced you're right; but only after a neurosurgical intervention, I suppose.
mmmm no, I hope.

 

click pic to enlarge

Maybe this sticker should become mandatory on the bridge as a note from NA's and builders. And a special note should go to the ship's owners that they should take care of the Upper Nut that they assigned as Captain . . . . . . .

Costa Europa's Captain killed three crew members on February 26, 2010 in Sharm el-Sheikh and used the wind as an excuse while other cruise ships canceled Sharm el-Sheikh that day because of the wind . . . .

MS Thomson Dream, the former Costa Europa ---> 2010 dock collision

It's said in another thread (link - link) that Schettino was the Captain but I couldn't find confirmation or disconfirmation about that...

Google "Costa Europa Sharm el-Sheikh" or "Costa Europa accident" or "Costa Europa pier" or "Costa Europa dock" for more . . .

Thank you both for your knowledgeable posts in this and other threads . . . .

Cheers,
Angel

 

I would like to extend posts 153 and 159 which are very interesting.

I don't want to dispute the causal origin of the "Costa Concordia" capsize which is clearly a human error from people on the bridge, a stupid electronically aided grounding.

I am interested in what happen after the stupid thing made by the captain, in terms of general and particular damage stability issue.

The question raised by this casualty is : do SOLAS past ("Costa Concordia") and present damage stability rules are sufficient for such vessels ?

Damage stability rules are a permanent conflict between economical interests (the commercial activity of the vessel) and the safety level obtained through the rules: very roughly we could say that the more we subdivise a vessel the more safe she is, but the limit is the operation of the vessel (commercial activity). In fact, the rules are a compromise in between these radically opposite requirements.

"Costa Concordia" built in 2006 has been designed according to SOLAS 1974 amended 1990/1998. These rules are so called "deterministic rules". We assume a damage (approx. length 11 m and penetration of B/5, i.e 6 m here) everywhere on the vessel length and according to floodable length and factor of subdivision calculation we find a subdivision. This subdivision is valid up to a sinking limit, the margin line which is approx. the bulkhead (subdivision) deck. The rules is requiring in parallel that the vessel "sinks" up to the margin line with a list (heel) of 12° maximum.

We may assume that "Costa Concordia" has compartments of approx. 12-15m long. I don't know at time what was the standard of the vessel : 2 or 3 floodable compartments, but I would guess 2 compartments in line with similar vessels. In any case, the damage suffered by the vessel was far over these limits. Then designers, builders and legislators are not responsible. But does this statement completely true and present situation acceptable ?

The deterministic rules are unsufficient for large passenger vessels. It is a well known fact among maritme community. It has been the reason why International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has changed the paradigme of damage stability rules, after 10 years of works and discussions at the SLF sub-committee (in charge of stability matters at IMO). The new paradigme is called "probabilistic damage stability" and very often referred as "SOLAS 2009". The idea was not initially to improve the rules but to change the calculation approach. In fact, some small improvements have been introduced for large passenger vessels.

Deterministic rules dedicated calculations were rather difficult. Probabilistic ones are far more complicate and opaque. The basic ideas are:
1) there are no more indications for how to subdivise the vessel, the designer is free to act provided the result (index of subdivision) is o.k (see below)
2) all volumes and compartments (and combinaison of) are associated with a probability of beeing flooded
3) a probability factor of survivability is calculated for each flooded volume(s)
4) probability calculated in 3 and 4 are multiplied
5) all these individual multiplications are added up (thousands of cases for large passenger vessels)
The figure found in 5 is the attained index of subdivision (a measure of the safety level) which should be superior to a required index of subdivision.

There are no more "floodable length", "subdivision factor'' and "margin line" calculations. The vessel may sink over the bulkhead deck, provided :
- that the escape ways are "dry"
- that basic functions like watertight doors control are still operational, etc.
There are no more formal limits for heel in damage condition: the probability factor calculated in above 3 is switching to 0 if heel is above the 12° value (which means that the case is not contributing to the global attained index).

The obtained index is rather scientific (it is based on statistics of casualties and important theoretical researches)

The required index is purely "politic". Its value is an image of what the society (IMO i.e the maritime community) is prepared to accept in terms of risk. For vessels like "Costa Concordia" I guess the required subdivision index would have been approx. = 0,88 if the vessel would have been designed according to probabilisitic rules. Roughly speaking it means that 12% of the damages will not be survived.

The question which should be discussed in the aftermath of "Costa Concordia" disaster is : does the new rules are good enough ? does the level of the required index is sufficient ?

As an example in the passenger ferries activity (ropax), the SOLAS 2009 probabilistic rules appears to be inferior for some projects compared to the combination of deterministic rules [SOLAS 90 + Stockholm Agreement] which these vessels have to comply with...

May be not only stupid seamen killed people...

Francois-Xavier Nettersheim

 

In other less words, slash on its side, and the puppy is going to flip and sink.
If you make the ships 2/3 the beam to height above water, and keep a 1/3 underwater, this would not happen.

 

I replied to this question (?) in the thread 'Last voyage for Costa ... with post nr 866 and 868 with a picture to prove my presence onboard the Europa.