I am sure that the salvage teams tried every which way to right her, but I do find it strange that they were not able to.
I remember at the time having wild ideas about parbuckling her back upright with tugs and anchors, but this is much easier said than done.
A quote from the article :
"Ultimately fire, flooding and saltwater corrosion meant the ship was declared a total loss estimated at $62.5 million, the NTSB said in its report, and an estimated $142 million worth of cargo was lost."
I hate to think what the final cost of the salvage operation will be, re how they have had to cut the ship up in sections, and then take the sections away to be scrapped. Even the combined value of the ship and her cargo must have been a fraction of the total salvage cost. Would the vessel's P & I Insurers have to pay for these salvage costs?
The report notes that the Chief Officer made mistake(s) while entering data into the stability programme prior to sailing - but they do not mention that he might well have been fatigued from working many hours. The incident happened in the early hours of the morning, and the Mate had probably been 'on the go' for a long time without much sleep.
The three (main) conclusions in the report - in armchair retrospect it does seem amazing that they did not appear to have proper stability procedures in place, nor a departure check list re the W/T doors - there should be a panel on the bridge showing a longitudinal section through the ship with the positions of all the W/T doors, and red / green LED markers to show if they are open or closed. Yet nobody noticed that two of the doors were still open on departure.
The NTSB's recommendations
As a result of its investigation, the NTSB recommended that the operator of the vessel, G-Marine Service Co. Ltd., create procedures for verifying stability calculations before a vessel leaves port.
It also recommended the company verify the crew follows a departure checklist regarding the closing of watertight doors.
On the Golden Ray, the NTSB found, "the two watertight doors had been left open for almost 2 hours before the accident. However, no one on the bridge ensured that the doors were closed before departure from the port."
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There have been a few other high profile car carrier capsizes, including the Cougar Ace in July 2006 - she was later successfully righted, but her cargo was written off. -
MV Cougar Ace - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Cougar_Ace
And also the Hoegh Osaka in the Solent (on the south coast of England) - she also capsized when she started to change course after leaving Southampton in January 2015.
The MAIB produced a very comprehensive report about her here -
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/56e9a7afe5274a14d9000000/MAIBInvReport6_2016.pdf
In the report they note :
"A key finding of the MAIB investigation is that no departure stability calculation had been carried out on completion of cargo operations and before Hoegh Osaka sailed. Witness and anecdotal evidence suggests that this practice extends to the car carrier sector in general. The fundamental requirements for establishing before departure that a ship has a suitable margin of stability for the intended voyage had been eroded on board Hoegh Osaka such that unsafe practices had become the norm."
And this happened almost 5 years before Golden Ray capsized.
Edit - there are various threads on the YBW Forum about Hoegh Osaka, including this one which was started when she ran aground on the Brambles bank -
Ship aground on Brambel bank? https://forums.ybw.com/index.php?threads/ship-aground-on-brambel-bank.418080/
And this one later on discussing the MAIB report -
Hoegh Osaka! https://forums.ybw.com/index.php?threads/hoegh-osaka.452182/