Wow! Alan.
You seem to be saying that the 777 and the 787 are totally reliant on on on board computers to fly.
What if something clogs up the pitot static system?
Now the computer doesn't know how high the plane is, how fast it's moving through the air, or even if it's in a stall or not.
How can it fly the plane now?
IIRC, a French 777 crashed in the Atlantic due to a problem like this. In the "Air Crash Investigation" episode, they gave the impression that the pilots could have done something about it, had they known what was wrong.
From what you're saying now, it appears that the matter was completely out of their hands.
Could they have saved themselves by deploying the RAT?
It seems that the RAT is capable of giving the computer at least some of the data it's missing, due to the stopped up pitot static system.
The French 777 apparently did a belly flop, just as you say this plane could have. The French plane left a huge part of its tail section behind.
Is it really possible to steal a 777, without its mandatory systems identifying it everywhere it goes?
I have to be very careful how i answer this. i do not want to discourage you from flying in any way, or to detract from the exemplary standard for safety kept over the decades. You are far safer on the airplane than on the drive to the airport. This has always been true, and will remain so.
Air France flight 447 was an Airbus A-330, and not a Boeing product. The Airbus A-330 is ‘nearly’ fly by wire, though exactly how much i do not know. The rudder pedals are still mechanically connected to the rudder for instance. After every aircraft incident (crash, or near miss), regardless of make or model, Boeing conducts a sort of ‘post mortem’, and though i was not one of the investigators, i did attend their report-out of AF Flt 447. It contained lessons for us all and i remember parts of it still.
Unfortunately I am not at all familiar with the details of the Airbus system. Airbus apparently uses a primary flight computer each for the pilot and co-pilot, and each of these have a back up. There is an auxiliary flight computer as well, making a total of 5. These drive at least three separate and independent flight control jack systems from at least three separate hydraulic systems. some systems may be electric, rudder and flaps for instance.
The individual primary airspeed instruments (there are 3) are fed their information from their own pitot heads, and the auxiliary, or backup (third) system is fed from another. Normally each instrument is fed from its own pitot head, but should one fail (see below), any instrument can be fed from any pitot head. You should see these pitot heads on the outside, just below the cockpit windows, at least on Boeing airplanes. You will also see the AOA sensors, tiny wind vanes that sense the angle the air is approaching the airframe.
There are two other sources of air data for these flight computers, inertial navigation, and GPS. On Boeing airplanes these are both triplicated, giving a total of 9 sources of speed, altitude, pitch up (or down), vertical speed, direction, and in the case of the GPS (and technically the inertial system) absolute position in 3D space.
As the Flt 447 approached turbulence, the aircraft was pitched up, and for some unknown reason the autopilot disconnected. This is just like the cruise control on your car disconnecting if you touch the brake pedal, even if you do not break. Unfortunately, the flight controls also reverted to a different set of ‘laws’ giving far more sensitive control response. Again a bit like some cars that have a ‘performance’ mode, where a push button activates a faster throttle response, firmer suspension, and faster automatic gear changes at higher RPM’s. Mine does anyway, though i don't use it.
This is where the mistakes began. The PIC (pilot in command, in this case a co-pilot) tried to level the plane using his side-stick controller. He over-controlled, several times, but this did not cause the incident. He also noticed his airspeed indicator was reading zero, and at that moment the stall warning buzzer sounded. This may have confused the pilots, but should not have. None of the pilots observed standard good airmanship. Standard procedure is to have each pilots instrument feeding from a different pitot head, so any discrepancy is noted immediately. There is then a procedure to discover which one, or both were incorrect.*
Equally, regardless of anything else going on, any pilot knows to put the nose of the aircraft down when the stall warning sounds. This allows the airplane to build up flying speed again absolutely regardless. That is what the stall warning is for. In fact, and for no reason anyone can even guess, they added full power (totally acceptable), and pulled the nose UP (totally unacceptable). Some journalist wrote it is difficult (he said impossible) to fly an airplane without speed indication. This is rubbish, there are many other instruments and indications as to what the airplane is doing available. For instance, the vertical attitude indicator, (originally called the artificial horizon), will show if the plane is level fore and aft as well as side to side. The AOA (angle of attack) indicator will show the airplane pitch attitude relative to local airflow too. The rate of climb/dive meter will show instantaneous rate of change of altitude. Even the oldest instrument on board, the compass, will show relative angle of the earth to the compass card. I often fly using the climb/dive meter as reference, (absolute altitude IS important in controlled airspace) though strictly speaking i suppose i should use airspeed for this.
Regardless, the PIC held the airplane in a climb until it reached 38,000ft, its absolute ceiling at the current weight and load. Then the plane did stall, and though still at 100%N, actually 102%N (100%N is full engine power) it started to slip backwards and downwards though still pointed upward. Now the Captain climbed into his seat, but even he maintained the plane at a high angle of attack. In fact he maintained this attitude for the next 3 minuets whilst the plane slid down and impacted the sea still with the nose more than 45 degree above horizontal. The plane hit the water tail first, at about 45 degrees nose high. If at any time during this incident, any pilot had pushed the controls forward, OR switched the autopilot back on, the plane would have recovered by itself and all would have been saved.
Boeing uses four completely separate and independent flight control computers, each fed primary flight information by all 9 sources. These computers are different chip sets, different languages (one is “Fourth”, perhaps another Cobal), and completely different code sets, written by different people (usually in different US states), so there can be no common fault effecting all of them at once. Each computer controls a completely separate set of hydraulic jacks, and in many cases these drive different sections of the control surface. Actually each of these jacks are duplicated as well, and all jacks can be driven from any of four independent hydraulic systems. Initial (first) failure is calculated as 10 to the 9th.
The RAT only supplies power (electric and hydraulic) to vital systems in the event of complete power failure on the plane. I don't remember all the systems supported, but it includes all flight instruments, all flight computers, and at least half the hydraulic jacks. It generates sufficient power to lower the landing gear and flaps though not at the same time. In fact batteries are also available, and do power some auxiliary systems, emergency lighting (cockpit and cabin) and the PA system, probably other systems too.
Pitot tubes, wing leading edges, AOA indicators, engine inlets, windscreens, and a few other items are de-iced, or anti-iced during flight. De-iced means shedding ice as it accumulates, sometimes using a rubber boot on the leading edge of a wing (look at your next commuter airplane), but anti-ice never lets ice build up at all. I do not know the Airbus system, but have heard it is automatic, i.e. turns on when the airplane deems it is needed. Boeing has a manual anti-ice system and we expect the pilot to turn it on when he deems it necessary. I know pilots who simply turn this on before or after take off, and turn it off on arrival. It uses waste heat anyway, so no extra fuel burnt.
In the Air France Flt 447 case, one theory is the pitot heads iced up. Whilst possible, this is a little unusual, assuming the system was actually on. It is not normal for all three pitot heads to ice at the same time, and regardless any pilot can switch his flight speed reading, on his primary (head down) display, his auxiliary display, his back up display, and even his engine status display, from pitot head(s) to GPS(s), or inertial navigation(s) at any time. This is part of standard training.
Subsequently Airbus changed their pitot heads on the A-330 twice. Boeing usually uses two different makes of pitot head, and even makes it impossible to install the wrong one, by making the hole patterns different.
Air France Flt 447 was a very sad but completely unnecessary loss of life. We learned a lot from it, as we will from this Malaysian flight.