Safer cruise ship designs

The failure is human.

All this is true. And let me place a scenario for your pondering. If this would have been a ravenous fire instead, how many of the crew would have tried to fight the fire or rescue their fellow crew or passengers? Most would not. If you group 5000 people who never met each other and put them in a crisis situation do you expect bravery or every man for themselves?

 

I do not favor over-regulation or needless regulation.

However, in the stability and last voyage threads on the Costa Concordia some categorized it as a death trap.

It seemed logical to ask, what are some [even] safer design cruise ships?

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-...-down-35-after-accident-ceo-tells-stampa.html said Costa cruise bookings are down 35% after the accident.
Cruise ships which had additional safety features could possibly be a selling point ???
Can smaller ships be equally profitable?

 

Logical or not, possibly an opening for alternate cruise ship styles:

"Sven Lindblad, founder of Lindblad Expeditions, says the 33-year-old soft adventure cruise line is having its best first quarter ever, with revenues running 19% above last year. By comparison, the brands of Carnival Corp., Royal Caribbean and others have reported booking declines in the teens following the Concordia crash"

http://travel.usatoday.com/cruises/...reports-big-boost-in-cruise-bookings/631031/1

 

You can never make anything sailor proof. They have a lot of time on thier hands, they are persistant, and they have power tools....

Edit, best sailor joke ever...

Weld a sailor into a 3m steel cube with 3 bowling balls. Leave him there for one week.

a) He will lose one
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.
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b) He will break one
..
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.
...wait for it
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.
.
c) the third will come up pregnant....

 

"Some" on the threads??? only unknowledgable persons. The people who rant that it was a death trap have other agendas than achieavble ship safety. Any ship can be profitable or not, that is not a function of the SOLAS requirements or even the design. Where is the "tramp" steamer in this discussion...they have gone the way of the ocean liner (as opposed to the cruise liner) because that is not what people want to purchase (though there are still some out there). Anytime you want large spaces as opposed to innconvient sub-division you give up something. People do not want to be 6 to a 3m x 5m compartment anymore.

 

I think the question should be in the case of a multi-compartment failure, is the inevitable outcome either grounding or sinking, as well as partial or complete capsizing?

And, ofther than having a captain.
What were the tools that a captain would have needed to quickly determine the extent of the damage and mount an adequate response.

What about improving the evacuation of 4000 to 6000 passengers?

 

As far as improvements, one of the first things that comes to mind is safer lifeboat deployments.

Several of the Costa Concordia port side lifeboats failed to deploy. Had the ship actually sunk some of them might have been able to be released at the instant the ship went under, but such deployment would be exceptionally dangerous.

Had the ship rapidly developed a severe list as in the case of the Cougar Ace, it is possible that none of the life rafts would be deployable as the starboard ones could become underwater, and the port side ones couldn't be released.

I would suggest designing a track that could guide the boat over the first railing, and a wheeled or tracked cradle/crawler system that could safely guide the ship down the side of the ship and to the water. Hopefully keeping the ship level on the way down. Unpowered, and it should be able to handle a list up to about 80 degrees or so. Powered, and it should be able to go beyond 90 degrees.

It could be designed as special bumpers integral to the lifeboatts, or more likely a detacheable frame that would get dumped as the boat is released. Or, perhaps a combination of the two.

Obviously there is a need for redundant lifeboat capacity. There are stories of people who were turned away due to boats being full. Also redundant life jackets as not all of them may be accessible when needed. Perhaps also inflatable boats deployable from strategic locations.

 

I have to wonder what navigation systems were lost on the Costa Concordia after flooding the main generator room, as well as likely the propulsion room.

It seems odd that all 6 generators and the two propulsion motors would be knocked out with a single event.

However, what was left, and capable to be powered on backup generators?
Rudder Control?
Bow and Stern Jets (at reduced power?)
Anchor Control?
Lateral Stabilizer Control?
All the bridge navigation gizmos?
What about control of the powered watertight doors, and access to all the status sensors?
Bilge Pumps? Obviously not enough to pump out the main flooded compartments, but sufficient to deal with slow leaks.
Ballast Transfers?

The animations that I've seen seem to indicate that a starboard turn was initiated about 5 minutes after the accident. The ship then seems to enter a starboard spin. Is that due to a stuck rudder, or a zero-power turn? It inevitably leads to the ship being turned side-on to the wind and being blown back to port.

The Port Stabilizer also appears to be oriented to lift the port side. Appropriate for the initial port list, but inappropriate for the later starboard list, although it would have been largely ineffective when the ship was drifting.

Could an engine room fire similarly knock out all propulsion?

I would think one could distribute the generators along the keel, rather than in 2 successive compartments. Exhaust could still be routed to a single smokestack if desired. Or, use an odd number of generators, with one or two generators isolated from the others and mounted in the bow.

Also isolate the propulsion motors, so a side-damage wouldn't flood both.

Could one build a secondary propulsion motor/jet that could be deployed, perhaps from in, or near the bow bulb that would be capable of 1 or 2 knots propulsion?

The last thing would be emergency procedures. Seal all watertight doors. Obviously design the ship to isolate decks and prevent successive flooding of decks. Start evacuating the lower decks as soon as possible. Get everyone outfitted with lifejackets as soon as possible, and bring them into common areas. Visually check that all rooms are empty, and that all watertight doors are properly sealed. Roll Call. Direct the 30% staff members to start evacuation preparations early.

One also needs to consider escape paths from ships at various angles including 90° laying on the side, or perhaps even rolled further. Upside-down? Bow or stern sinking? Ladders under floor boards?

 

How about a box that requires two keys from two sane persons before allowing a change to their predetermine course by more than a mile. Oh I forgot the fools would find a away to override that too.

Or an alarm every 15 minutes if they overrode course settings and where of track.

 

lifeboat deployment system

Definitely. All good points.
Squidly started a thread on this too http://www.boatdesign.net/forums/bo...-abandon-ship-procedures-up-graded-42091.html

 

I've been thinking about the same for some autonomous and remote-controlled vessels. Given the simplicity, I'm amazed it isn't standard on
many large vessels.

Are there any good arguments against such a system?

 

What about the recognition of Peter's Principle? That is promoting someone to the level of their incompetence!

Or as in in the original quote " Give anything to Peter that works and he will find a way to break it".

 

Of course the Costa Concordia had an alarm to tell them that they were off course.
The crew simply turned off the alarm.

I have no doubt the first officer would have allowed the captain to order a "sail-by".

However, someone in corporate headquarters should also be made aware of these course deviations. The company should not be able to deny that it was a "standard practice". Or, should at least have the data to evaluate their captains performance.

Obviously in the post-analysis, the earlier sailby of Giglio was also closer than would have been safe.

I'm not sure how accurate the course planning is on these behemouth ships. Perhaps one option would be to setup a touch-screeen interface on the bridge where a captain could roughly draw the desired course. Then, the ship would calculate the turns necessary, as well as safety margins. The computer could even add in wind and current data. All the controls are electronic anway, it should be possible to essentially have the ship being guided on "auto", although I'm sure the Captain would still prefer to handle the conrols himself.

Even if handled by hand, the computer could show a safe corridor including turns necessary for the maneuver, and have multiple alarms as soon as a collision is predicted, perhaps with several minutes to react.

Many indications are that the final turn of the Costa Concordia was initiated just a few seconds late.

Is it possible that there were truly maps that did not show the maximum extent of rock outcroppings?

 

The boat hit the rocks.

It's the Captains job to keep the boat from hitting the rocks.

If the Captains does his or her job then there is no problem.

Human error is to blame for 70% of all transport accidents.

Better Captains and Crew = Safer Transportation.

-Tom