Bourbon Dolphin capsizes

The article on defence of the design got me thinking of a 'formula' for safety.

Understanding+Foresight+Communication+Competence+Commitment=Safety

I know it is simplistic, but could such a formula provide a handy reference. Is there something that any of you feel I have missed in this formula? The terms are explained in more detail below.

Understanding = Knowledge of hazards and means to analyse and control risks

Foresight = Ability to anticipate what can happen and to recognise the effect of changing circumstances.

Communication = Information essential to the safety of an activity gets to the person who needs it, be it stability documentation, information on actual operations for preparation of stability documentation, etc.

Competence = The capacity of people through knowledge and experience to apply safety information

Commitment = The commitment to safety within a company culture, the leadership qualities of the company management and the vessel master, the scope of legislation and the degree to which it is effectively implemented, and the extent to which society is prepared to pay for safety, etc.

It would be interesting to measure the Bourbon Dolphin and other incidents against the 'formula' to see where the weaknesses may have lain.

I was reading a book last night that described a capsize of a fishing vessel on the Australian Coast 20 years ago. The boat was in very heavy weather with some of the brine tanks slack. The master knew that the stability seemed a bit dodgy and was going to press the tanks, but someone said there was a snack ready, so he decided he would eat now press the tanks later. The result was that the trawler capsized. Fortunately the crew all survived after six days in the liferaft. But the skipper never had his own boat again.

This is another example that shows most of the minimum statutory standards are intended to forgive human error, in this case it was the lifesaving equipment that saved them. However, relying on safety equipment to reduce the consequences of inadequate stability is unreliable to say the least. Capsize and explosion are perhaps the most unforgiving events that a vessel could face. Hence the need to ensure that measures put in place for their prevention are effective.

So when you next prepare a stability document, it might be worth considering its value in the safety 'formula'. There is no use providing essential information in a form that the user cannot understand. To what extent does it anticipate actual conditions of loading? Will the user have the competence needed to apply the information? Do you as a professional have the commitment to safety to ensure essential information is provided in a form that is meaningful for the user?

Sometimes one can become distracted by time and cost pressures, and the frustrations of complying with rigid regulations. Sometimes one gets lost in the details. It might be useful from time to time to step back and look at the big picture using the safety 'formula'.

Best regards
Mori

 

Mori, that is a great post, well done.

I love the sea but am a pleasure sailor and stand on the sidelines in trhese discussions hoping to learn from you more knolwedgeable fellows.

I am a commodity trader however your formula is as applicable for business as it is for yacht/ship design !

Understanding+Foresight+Communication+Competence+Commitment=Safety

If you dont mind, I will use you formula plus explanation with my collegues to demonstrate that in todays volatile markets the same precautions that might save a ship will also save a trading company from going under.

Cheers
Richard

 

Dear Richard

I am glad that you might find the post useful. You are welcome to use it for other applications. An acknowledgement as to the source would be appreciated.

May I suggest a modification to the 'formula' so that it would now look like:

Understanding x Foresight x Communication x Competence x Commitment = Safety

The reason for the change from a sum to multiplication is that if any of these factors is zero, the result is inevitably going to be unsafe. You can see that, if you use notional values such that "Complete" = 1 and "None" = 0 with the reality somewhere in between, unless care is taken to ensure that each factor is adequately addressed, the safety result can quickly become unacceptably small. The chain of factors is a bit like a game of 'Chinese whispers', each relies on the others to achieve the final result.

Regards
Mori

 

Hi Mori,

I take your point that the values cannot be zero, although havent got my mind as yet around whether the values should be multiplied (which would require the factors to be stated in order of importance to maintain the integrity of the final result, or sufficient to say the sums can be totalled as long as each value has to be greater than zero. Retorically, the expression X plus Y would suffice however if you intend to actually appoint known values to each factor to create a final and comparable score, it might have to become more technical.

At which point I recognise the 13 hour time difference between us (you are fresh and I am knacked) and gracefully withdraw !!

Will gladly acknolwedge you.
Richard

 

Dear Richard

You have hit the nail on the head! That's the whole point of the change. There is no priority between factors. Each relies on the factors before and the factors after to achieve the final result. There is no use having complete understanding by the naval architect without the operator having competence to put the safety measures into effect. Similarly, there is no use having excellent communication if there is nothing substantive to communicate.

Chew it over in the morning and get back to me with any further thoughts.

Regards
Mori

 

“Ulstein delivered an approved stability manual with examples of realistic conditions. In such a manual it isn’t possible to provide an exhaustive list of conditions, as that would make the guide too comprehensive. Current conditions outside of those that are specified in the stability manual shall be calculated manually on board the ship. This includes not least anchor handling."

???? This has to be a classic in self-serving statements. I'm willing to bet personal funds that the Ulstein CEO's comments were written by the legal department, intended to erect a fence against lawsuits. I have 2 questions:

1. How could a guide to something as critical as stability ever be "too comprehensive"?

2. "Conditions outside of those specified in the stability manual ... includes not least anchor handling". This ship was designed, classified, and sold as an anchor handling vessel, yet anchor handling is not covered in the stability manual?

 

Mori,

Your formula is one of those concepts so painfully obvious that it is too often not considered in practice.

I agree with the geometric vs arithmetic progression of the elements. If any one is zero, the safety factor becomes zero.

 

Mori - You 'hit the nail on the head' to use a well known phrase! I'm also inclined to agree that only the sum of the total would actually equal Safety, anything less would of course be unsafe!

You have a winner here! Standby for it to 'pop up' in Safety Lectures world wide (not just the marine industry). with your permission of course!


Mike (the Walrus)

 

It is evident from the DGPS plot that she was definitely being dragged back at an average of 3 kts. before she stopped transmitting a position (antenna submerged?). She had been dragged back on her previous attempt for a longer distance but not quite at the same speed.

The big difference was that she had lost an engine at the time she first rolled after the load was allowed to move across to port. She would have been under a degree of control the previous time, but at the mercy of the load, the tension and the listing after losing most of her power.

You previously suspected that the engine could have stopped before, rather than as a result of, the initial roll and I have always thought that this is also a point that has never been investigated thoroughly. I don't know if the engine room panels would show what system had tripped, but there will probably be people who could tell if they were to see ROV video. I do know that a mini ROV can be sent out from a normal ROV and get into almost anywhere.

The Highland Valour reported black smoke from the Dolphin after the first roll. I wonder if this was the Emergency Generator starting up. I think it should have been vital to ascertain, if possible, the reason why the engine stopped given the Engineers concerns during the previous hour.

Murdo

 

The Norwegian report is very thorough, and points to a number of deficiencies in several areas. These are probably all valid in themselves. But the report does not single out one particular issue as the main cause or the one that people should IMMEDIATELY take action on.

That is perhaps one reason why (since the report) few people seem to be focusing on what is probably the underlying reason the ship capsized, which appears to be the effect of her getting sustantially out of line with the load (or tow) - the very thing - "girting" - which has always been the most dangerous for a "tug" of any kind.

No doubt a vessel with greater initial stability would have resisted an out-of-line pull better, but if the BD had simply had her load move to the pins/bulwark in a nearly fore/aft direction then maybe she would have survived.

There are a number of vessels apart from anchor handlers which hang heavy weights over their stern and over the side (crane ships, pipelayers and cable layers in up to 3000m of water). These operations generate huge tensions which are generally calculated in the stabilty for the vessel - including (sometimes) the cases where the load is at one side of the ship and not the centreline. The saving grace for most of these ships in really deepwater is that (normally, unless in case of DP drive off) the load goes straight down and is not streamed out behind or beside the ship. Anchor handlers have to cope with a horizontal load component - hence their big bollard pull.

What is not generally calculated is the effect of the pull of the load being out of line with the ship. There are so many variables that the basis for this calculation is hard to set (although the Norwegian Commission has now made a proposal). For that reason it is not demanded explicitly in most stability regulations that I know of.

But it is of course very dangerous - you can pull over quite large ships with a relatively modest transverse pull especially if the thrusters assist in the overturning by pushing in the other direction.

I am sure of two things;

1) the BD accident and the report HAS created a lot of attention in the class societies (especially DnV) who are now looking at all sorts of vessels again. Where it will end we don't know yet.

2) if I was responsible for the operation of vessels which deal with such huge and varying loads, I would warn the crews of the danger of crabbing across the line of the load - and to try to ensure the line of the load is kept in line with the ship fore/aft axis - because the stability book and ship design almost certainly NEVER took the crabbing situation into account

You can see on page 201 of the report that the Norwegian commission is recommending that future anchor handling stability is approved on the basis of calculations showing the effect of the load being at an angle of attack 25 degrees (minimum) to the centreline of the vessel (and 90 degrees in some cases - if I read it right).

 

"you can pull over quite large ships with a relatively modest transverse pull especially if the thrusters assist in the overturning by pushing in the other direction." JRM

Two highly relevant points. I would hope that, once the inevitable "not our fault" statements have been made, Ulstein and other designers, and the classification people will do some serious work to calculate the effect of very large dynamic loads. Unlike crane and pipelaying vessels, AHTS vessels can be subjected to loadings whose force and direction change rapidly, as an inherent part of their primary function. Leaving it up to the master to "calculate manually" is not an acceptable position.

 

No Charlie it is not, but as we both know there are times when the only thing that has saved the vessel is this "manual calculation" done by the Master or whoever is on the bridge at the time - things move that quickly!

 

Mori,
Next wednesday the 21st I'll read a lecture on small fishing boats safety from the stability and watertightness point of view, at a technical session on 'Small Fishing Vessels Safety' to be hold within the Navalia exhibition.
If you allow me, I'll quote you and use your formula there. Would you please post here or send to me a PM with your title and precise present occupation?

As you know, John Womack (SNAME) has proposed a 'Load matrix' to be used aboard small FV instead of the always unread stability booklet. I think you already know the 'Research Project 530 on Simplified Presentation of FV Stability Information' from the Wolfson Unit. They are using the Matrix already in Norway and Island, at least.

In Spain we still do not do something like that and still produce the long and tedious official stability booklet no FV Master reads. I have had my share of struggling with the spanish maritime authority surveyors for them to at least accept to locate the 'Master instructions' first thing in the booklet. Some of the surveyors didn't like the idea and obliged to make the booklet 'as it always has been done' (!). My present struggle now is for them to accept and introduce the 'Load Matrix' idea, or something in that line.

Cheers.

 

1. Well, I can accept it's almost impossible to study every possible load & working condition, but at least those more relevant -specially those posing special risks, as AH is- have certainly to be studied.

2. What I found absolutely unacceptable in the BD case is them (designers, builders and surveyors) not having studied such AH conditions. It seems just only the general minimum IMO conditions for OSV were studied (If any other, I would like Ulstein's CEO telling us which).

Hi, JRM, welcome to these forums.
It is not explicitly demanded and there are many variables, indeed, but it is also true that designers/surveyors have the obligation to be cautious and try to foresee whatever conditions can pose a major risk on the vessel. Many regulations state this clearly.

I'd say that having just studied the Self Tripping and Tow Tripping criterions for this vesel, would have significantly risen the levels of safety.


Cheers.

 

I like the formula Mori...although I feel I have to suggest a possible missing factor. That factor is most definitely 'luck'. I know that all regulatory bodies and safety authorities would like to be able to scratch this one item out of all equations I still believe that this is a factor that is involved in almost every scenario that I deal with on the vessel. I just hope that it remains to be good luck.
--Chuck