Last voyage for Costa Concordia cruise ship

Fire is always a threat.

Unfortunately, I think our 'cruise ships' have exceeded reasonable safe standards.

When ships lose power and the ships list 10 to 20 degrees, they are not stable, nor safe - IMHO.

I think the mega in 'mega-ships' is really code for 'mega-disaster.'

If they cut the height of these ships down by 30% to 50%, the ships would gain safety when they do lose power, or have a fire. And most of them would be easier to evacuate.

But, dollars before safety? And I do not mean that people intentionally chose one over the other. But, the old cost per customer times the number of customers equation is dangerous when it is 'maximized.'

Maximize a McDonalds and you get some interesting beasts - check out some in Russia. But, maximizing ships has inherent risks that should make us scared of those risks.

 

Costa Concordia trial: Captain's lover was on bridge | BBC

 

The point of the Observatory - "We are still in a phase of anticipation that speaks of Spring as a possible period for commencement of work of removing the vessel from Giglio and in a phase of design verification while work continues construction of caissons that occurs on sites outside from Giglio. remains a high attention to environmental issues and to verify the possible risks related to the phase of rigalleggiamento. " The said Mary Sargentini, president of the Observatory of removal on the Costa Concordia meeting this afternoon, the population of Isola del Giglio. "How observatory we asked Costa Crociere to have an overview of the activities until after parbuckling rigalleggiamento also including activity design, as well as monitoring activities and construction and installation of caissons. We asked to have the picture of the phases of work for verification and to always have updated the progress of the work. " "What after parbuckling not was a dead time because many activities are carried out even if not directly in the yard in other places like Genoa and Livorno, where the boxes are being prepared for the starboard side of the ship. " "The ship - said the president of the Observatory for Monday, December 16 convened a working meeting in Florence - is stable. As to the timing prudently expect to have the results of the audits in progress and a more accurate picture of the different activities" Ship via a trailer? - "We are studying the possible options for the transport of the wreck. ship could go away in the trailer and get to a meeting to be arranged with the Vanguard or always in tow, go directly to a nearby port able to accept it." He said Franco Porcellacchia, project manager of removal of Concordia, Costa Cruises on behalf of always meeting today with the citizens of Isola del Giglio. Safes Recovered 405 - "On board the Concordia - added Porcellacchia - we have recovered the safes in cabins located on the side emerged. 405 We have taken, in agreement with the competent authorities. Now will be opened, inventoried and their contents returned to its rightful owners. "

concord observatory removal rigalleggiamento island lily giglionews

 

http://www.giglionews.it/2013121460...-in-primavera-possibile-rigalleggiamento.html

 

Come osservatorio abbiamo chiesto a Costa Crociere di avere un quadro generale delle attività dal dopo parbuckling fino al rigalleggiamento comprensivo anche delle attività di progettazione, oltre che delle attività di monitoraggio e di allestimento e installazione dei cassoni. Abbiamo chiesto di avere il quadro delle fasi di lavoro per le opportune verifiche e per avere sempre aggiornato lo stato di avanzamento dei lavori".

"Quello dopo il parbuckling non è stato un tempo morto perché molte attività vengono portate avanti anche se non direttamente nell'area di cantiere in altri luoghi come Livorno e Genova, dove si stanno approntando i cassoni per il lato di dritta della nave". "La nave - ha concluso il presidente dell'Osservatorio che per lunedì 16 dicembre ha convocato una riunione operativa a Firenze - è stabile. Quanto ai tempi prudentemente aspettiamo di avere gli esiti delle verifiche in corso e un quadro più preciso delle diverse attività"

Nave via a rimorchio? - "Stiamo studiando le possibili opzioni per il trasporto del relitto. La nave potrebbe andare via a rimorchio e raggiungere un punto di incontro da stabilire con la Vanguard oppure, sempre a rimorchio, andare direttamente in un porto vicino capace di accoglierla". Lo ha detto Franco Porcellacchia, responsabile del progetto di rimozione della Concordia per conto di Costa Crociere sempre nell'incontro di oggi con i cittadini di Isola del Giglio.

Recuperate 405 casseforti - "A bordo della Concordia - ha aggiunto Porcellacchia - abbiamo recuperato le casseforti nella cabine poste sul lato emerso. Ne abbiamo prelevate 405, in accordo con le autorità competenti. Adesso verranno aperte, inventariate e il loro contenuto restituito ai legittimi proprietari."

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Costa Concordia captain | THE CREW REPORT

 

^^ I think it's an interesting take on the situation but many captains have managed to discharge their duty to their ship, crew and passengers acceptably after an accident. The real question in my mind was Schettino ever fit to hold the role of captain of a ship with 4000 passengers on board? That appears to me to be the more pertinent question.

If the captain is poorly equipped mentally to discharge his duty after the event by all means have a mechanism to have one of the other officers replace him.

 

Personally, I think this is compete bunk. A checklist works for one or two people dealing with one or two consoles of equipment where the response and efficacy of the actions is quickly apparent. It's one tool for assessing performance during simulations. It is used for training operators of many similar consoles where known failure modes and effects have been studied. It helps develop finger memory. In pilots, the procedural memory used to fly the plane can be overlaid with motor memory tasks specific to the emergency situation. I don't think cruise ship driving relies much on procedural memory skill sets. A ship's captain can devote his entire attention to an emergency without having to worry about falling out of the sky. This has a significant bearing on the attractiveness of checklists on ships.

A check list also gives the fellows on the spot something constructive to do while the remote experts are brought on line, and it gives the remote experts (or accident investigators) a set starting point to begin further troubleshooting. Obviously, there are crew procedures for emergencies that are implemented by a simple command. It is the captain's job to make that call, and you can't really put "this would be a good time to decide whether or not to abandon ship" on a check list.

Checklists are run in nonemergency situations by the commanders, but only subordinates run off checklists during an actual emergency. Any command exercise is devised to run you straight down a rabbit hole if you just follow the checklist. Planes are fundamentally different than boats. On a plane, if you lose propulsion, and don't get it back, there may be nothing at all to be done. On a boat, power loss doesn't consign everybody to a grave. It's a case of crowd management. A big, mobile, crowd that is capable of getting itself into all kinds of mischief. Very different from a plane. Different standards too. A plane captain that crashes, but saves half the passengers may be a hero. A boat captain isn't supposed to lose anybody. This makes the response much more particular. Find the few who are at risk and get them to safety. In a plane, you are all in the same boat (sorry), but in a boat, you usually aren't. You don't have to send search parties out to look for people on a plane. You don't have 1000 crew on a plane. If that's the advise they are getting, its not going to get any better.

There exist people who don't turn to soup when there is a surprise. It's the sort of thing you learn about an employee over a twenty year career. Heart rate spikes - yep. Adrenaline rush - yep. Brain shuts down- nope. If you need twenty people to run 20 billion-dollar boats, find these people. If you need 20,000 people to run 20,000 million-dollar boats, get good at check lists.

 

I think the truth is sort of in the middle. You need to drill in "codeword" responses. Drill until everybody can do it; in their sleep during the explosions and fire. Then from that point, once the immediate actions are accomplished, the CO can size up the situation while the Damage Control Assistant (DCA, usually the 1st officer) goes to handle the casualty. Everyone else falls into their trained assignments and deals with their trained/assigned duties...fire fighting, flood control, evacuation, restore power, etc.

But it is true about the adrenaline rush,...after all the blood, fire, and smoke is taken care of you go find a corner to get the shakes, cry, and puke your guts out in...or so is my experience.

 

We are always running checklists in complex situations. They are complex and branched checklists, but they are checklists nevertheless:

launching a lifeboat requires you do somethings in a certain order or the boat won't launch properly
And you of course don't launch when it is impossible to do so because of the heel of the boat

• And you don't launch over or under loaded
• And you have a checklist verified list of gear on board the boat even though they may never need to use the water-maker or EPIRB
• And once launched you have a checklist for how to correctly maneuver the boat
• and a checklist for how to properly distribute the passengers in the boat
• and a checklist
  for how to bring aboard folks in the water

Some of these are drilled into you, but in complex emergency situations, it is easy to forget something.

And the airplane comparison is interesting because that's a case where despite there being very limited time, they still take the time to follow specific procedures.

You can up the time pressure a bit say for combat. Where you do not have someone reading a checklist but instead have simpler checklists drilled into you (such as how to advance or retreat in a moving fire fight, how to call in for backup, when to call in for backup etc)

So in a ships situation, particularly in this era of PDAs capable of holding full CAD files of the whole ship, having a 'checklist' that you trigger that walks you through the processes so that you don't overlook something before making the informed decision as to whether or not to abandon ship

1. (is the hull damaged? Check
2. is thee damage severe enough to endanger safety? check
3. Is water coming on board? check
4. if the passengers stay on the ship what is their likelihood of injury or death?
5. If the passengers are in lifeboats what is their likelihood of injury or death in the current sea state?
6. etc. etc.)

 

But here lies a problem. Right now I oversee damage control issues. Yes, every watch stander has a e-pad with hyperlinked checklists which allow you to burrow several levels deep. However, as in question # 2 above, the watch stander has to wait until everyone else catches up. Phones have to be manned, tours have to be made, man-on-the-scene reports have to come in...the last thing you need is a checklist pulling the operator into a premature decision.

YES! things have to be done right away to assure maximum survival (like Sullenberger deploying the APU on flight 1548 ahead of the checklist), but you don't want to get ahead of yourself. 50%of the personnel causalities during the Fastnet were because people abandoned too early. You should step UP into the life raft! As I teach my operators, the difference between a leak and a flooding causality is how you perceive it.

 

But a properly structured checklist actually PREVENTS that premature decision rather than hastens it.... as in "have you receive MOS reports from stations X (check) Y (check) Z (check) and Zprime? (Z Prime? forgot about that one... )

 

After doing this for 20 years or so, I'm not sure. A checklist, like a situational screen, caused attention fixation. The operator is pre-primed for the next question, not evaluating what is happening. You should read the finding of the Three Mile Island accident. It is eye opening because of the things the operators chose to ignore, rather than upset the "known" course of action. A checklist drags the operator forward...unless it is open ended, it will never be collect-evaluate-decide. I always write my CASuality OPerationS (CASOPS) so that there is an evaluation point where several different measurements have to be brought into correlation. The meme is "do the best thing first (i.e. codeword response)...then evaluate the next option". Only well trained operators, people who rarely need checklists, can accomplish this.

 

If I understand the Costa Concordia’s last voyage correctly the Master thought that the planned 58° change of heading starboard at Isola del Giglio at 21.40 hrs was being executed more or less according to plan and he was not aware that the ship came too close to shore. The bridge crew had in fact started the turn a couple of minutes earlier than planned to pass further away from shore. When the Master suddenly became aware of being too close to shore (the helmsman had not followed orders or the rudder system didn’t work?) and ordered ‘hard starboard’ the resulting contact with some underwater object – rock – came as a complete surprise. Evidently it was an accident.

We do not know why the ship came too close as the Voyage Data Recorder was disconnected during the critical minutes prior contact. Evidently the Master raised his voice after this surprise but then all went according to preset plans. However as a result of the contact and the 36.5 meters long gash in the hull and up flooding of the generator room, there was a black out. But the emergency generator started and light was restored. After having established what compartments were up flooded and observed that the ship was stable and floating the Master also checked with the Genova office what to do and it was agreed to abandon ship and bring the passengers to Porto Giglio close by. The damaged vessel would then be towed somewhere for repairs.

The abandon ship was not performed correctly for many reasons. Passengers had not been told about mustering and mustering had not been trained and there were only two muster stations (!) aboard, etc, etc, and crew was missing to muster all passengers and to launch all LSA – lifeboats and life rafts. Evidently the ship was not seaworthy without proper muster list and systems.

By luck most people aboard got off but >300 were left behind, when the floating and stable ship suddenly capsized at 00.33 hrs next morning – a second incident – and crashed the deckhouse against the shallow sea floor on starboard side. The capsize also came as another surprise to the Master. He thought the ship was stable.

After capsize down flooding took place and the ship sank on the sloping sea floor and slid away from shore. Reason why the ship capsized appears to be progressive flooding of dry compartments through not tight watertight doors.

The extra water in the ship reduced stability to zero and capsize followed. It appears ship (and four sisters) had 25 watertight doors (each) fitted without Formal Safety Analysis and HAZOP and with incorrect instructions how to handle them. In my opinion the ship was not seaworthy due to all these illegal doors. SOLAS does not allow 25 watertight doors in any ship. According to the Master the watertight doors did not function!

In my opinion the ship owner was extremely lucky that not more people died on his not seaworthy ship. The shipowner should be in jail for operating such a bad ship. The Italian maritime authority should also be criticized for not having stopped the ship in port and requested improvements.

The Master is evidently not guilty of manslaughter, abandoning the ship early and having caused a ship wreck. So far the prosecution has just tried to show that the Master was entertaining passengers and staff too closely. The prosecution does not understand that the responsibility of seaworthiness rests with ship owner and maritime authority. The Master was just following the instructions given to him by the ship owner.

 

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