Simulating Costa Concordia

New Data - Costa Favolosa - 4th ship of the Concordia Class

Hi all - some more food for thought!

A retired colleague of mine has managed to find the two page write up in 'Significant Ships 2011' on Costa Favolosa the 4th ship of the Concordia class which appears to have all the same characteristics to the Concordia but 6 extra cabins though housing the same number of passengers. The last deck plan of the GA is the most interesting as it defines the ER arrangement in some detail and I am trying to get a higher res copy of this to pass on if I can. As construction started before the 5th Nov 2009 it is interesting to speculate whether it was built to the new Solas Regs or slipped in under the old rules. It is also interesting to note the quoted displacement of 55828 tonne as somewhat larger than that we had found for the Concordia, even though the design draft is the same at 8.2 m

 

Hi guys

I am new to this forum, so please excuse me if I am shooting myself in my feet posting here on this thread with this question, when there may be a more suitable thread elsewhere:

The issue of the Concordia's stability is also a very pertinent factor in any re-floating exercise.

Would any members have any comment to make on the re-floating method outlined in this blog:

http://everyday-cynic.blogspot.com/2012/04/part-11-summary-of-concordia-re.html

 

Your balloon idea has some merit. In the oil industry we have used "condoms" that fitted over live wellheads so that production could continue while hot work was being done close by in preparation for demolition and installation of more up to date modules. Any leaking gas was piped away to a safe vented area.
It would be better to place all your balloons first, with filling hoses running back to a barge. That way, nobody would have to enter the ship after it started to raise. The hoses would need to be quite strong as I know from experience with using balloons (inflatable plugs) in hydro-carbon pipework that the air pressure can choke a hose that gets squeezed by the balloon.

 

Larger Scale ER - Costa Favolosa - 4th ship of the Concordia Class

Attached is a larger scale version of the lower decks of the Concordia as an update to my post 106 above.

It is particularly interesting to note the stepped bulkheads around the generators - not yet sure where the control room is!

 

Why is it interesting to note a stepped (watertight) bulkhead around something? Does it improve anything? Safety after hull side damage, flooding of watertight compartments? Does a transversly stepped bulkhead change anything?

I assume the engine control room is on or above the bulkhead deck. Why put it down in the hull?

Why do you think Costa/Italy does not number the decks as per IMO/SOLAS rules?

 

The stepped bulkhead will have ensured the rapid flooding of the compartment forward of the forward generator room given the nature of the nature of the raking damage in this case. It is of interest only in that without the step this compartment might have been spared flooding in this damage scenario and the outcome might therefore have been different.

The Engine Control room is not likely to have been set in the Passenger Spaces (i.e. on or above the bulkhead deck) but somewhere below with direct communication to the main machinery compartments and the crew spaces - the norm with all passenger vessels I have ever had dealings with. My interest in its location is purely as a possible conduit for flood water into the starboard wing spaces above Deck A from the flooded engine rooms which I have proposed as the mechanism for the final capsize to starboard.

 

As draught d and depth D of the hull of modern cruiseships are small compared to breadth B, you can be sure that the ECR is located on top of the bulkhead deck at D above keel and that all passenger spaces are at least 2 or 3 decks above D. Note decks should be numbered from tanktop (1) upwards.
The problem is the crew cabins and ship stores spaces located below D. How do they communicate? WT doors? Forbidden according SOLAS. Who cares? Cruising is cheaper than ever - http://cruiseweb.com/cruise-critic-deal-of-the-week.htm .

 

Heiwa, I am surprised at your insistence on this issue. Your experience of passenger Ro-Ro's should be sufficient to realise that a depth of 8.5-9.0 m on breadths of 32 m is no barrier to placing an ECR below the bulkhead deck on vessels which also carry a large cargo cellar deck and void B/5 bulkheads along their entire length - witness the Italian built, SOLAS 90 'Pride of Hull & Rotterdam' (on which I have travelled in the last week and whose engine spaces I have had a guided tour). Rule No 1 for most Marine Engineers I have dealt with is to be as close as possible to their charges to be able to monitor them both visually and aurally as well as get to any problems that may develop as quickly as possible. In the case of CC the Depth of 14.2 m encloses 3 substantial decks (including the TT) on a breadth of 35.5 m and provides ample volume to place an ECR close to the primary power sources and ensure that the passengers on the Bulkhead Deck (Deck 1) and above are not disturbed by boilersuited crew whose activities are kept entirely below the Bulkhead deck.

'How do they communicate? WT doors?' are key issues which undoubtedly contributed to the final demise of this vessel in ways which need to be determined for the future safety of all passenger ships. Even SOLAS recognises that there will always have to be access through bulkheads in accommodation and the working spaces of a ship. Not only the nature and operation of doors needs careful consideration, but also the procedures that ensure such opennings are systematically secured during any emergency evacuation!

 

Thanks for refering to my ropax experience. Ropax vessels are SMALL compared to BIG CC and a different ball game.
I operated 20+ ropax 15 years ago, so I know.
M/S Estonia was a terrible ropax vessel. http://heiwaco.tripod.com/ekatastrofkurs.htm . The ECR of that tragic ship was located on first deck, #1, above TT (deck #0 ??) and thus below the bulkhead deck #2, i.e. <D, and between two watertight bulkheads. To visit the engine room the engine crew had to open/close a watertight door!
M/S Estonia sank mysteriously 9/94 and nobody knows how. One engineer, HS, had just been called down to investigate why the passenger toilet system didn't work. So HS went to the ECR. And then he opened one W/T door to go to the ER. Then he opened another W/T door to go to the gen/set room. But to visit the toilet/sewage tank room he had to open another 3 (!!) WT doors just to check the toilet system. And when he had done that ... M/S Estonia heeled over! HS, returned via the W/T doors to the ECR ... and later survived. Magic.
That's why on CC the ECR was above the bulkhead deck. You could visit any engine, generator, service space without opening W/T doors.
But in spite of this innovation there were plenty W/T doors in CC. And that's why she first capsized (after a small damage), then sank and finally, people were killed/drowned.
**** happens. Don't blame the Master, the CE, the crew. The ship was just badly designed.

 

Heiwa, if you are so sure the ECR is above the bulkhead deck on CC then I would welcome some insight as to exactly where it is and how the crew gain access to the various spaces?. Passenger Decks 1 (Bulkhead Deck) and 2 (see attached) have a small service trunk running between the cabins on the centreline but access to and from this is restricted by two staircases at either end a substantial set of engine uptakes in the centre. The main machinery takes up at least 6 WT compartments over about 30% of the ships length and all access between spaces would be by way of automatic horizontally sliding WT doors which open and close to allow the passage of one or two individuals at a time (probably P&S). To expect crew to climb 12.2 m every time they need to move between compartments is totally impractical!

'Pride of Hull/Rotterdam' to which I referred above are around half the size of CC but are no tiddlers at 31.85 m breadth and 6.01 m draught and nearly 60,000 GRT with 12 decks, 4 of which are for cargo. They all have the same automatic WT doors between their many ER compartments (two main engine) and sail with them closed. They have already had one engine room fire (Pride of Hull, Dec 2008) which is the primary reason for close vigilance.

The only mysteries around 'Estonia' are what holed her in the first place and why she sank. Once water reached her bulkhead deck she capsized rapidly as would any other RO-RO vessl. The fact that she then sank rather than remaining afloat on the surface upside down is the true mystery - but that is another story.

The CC suffered severe longitudinal raking damage (certainly not 'small') with very high inflow volumes, that is at the upper limit that any ship is expected to withstand under current regulations. The fact that this was not vertically without limit allowed her to remain afloat (near upright) rather than sinking within about 15 minutes as would have been expected if the internal crew decks along the side of her machinery spaces had not provided temporary support. This support could have been permanent if their WT integrity had been preserved. The fact that she took a further hour to commence a slow capsize to starboard is testimony to the fact that that her basic design (for this scenario) was good. The flaw, if any, is that leakage occured into the supporting decks to starboard at an average rate of about 1400 tonne/hour - just under 0.4 m3/s. Finding the openning(s) that allowed this to happen, and then spread longitudinally, would be instructive for future ship safety.

The fact that the ship's master did not use this reprieve to declare an emergency and evacuate the ship is the reason for the loss of life and is culpable! He seemed oblivious to the fact that progressive flooding was occuring that led to the capsize - was no-one monitoring the flooded spaces?

 

?? Actually, water on the bottom of any ship reduces stability (free surface effect) and a lot of water may reduce stability, so that vessel suddenly capizises ... like CC. The water need not reach the bulkhead deck for capsize to happen.
As you should know, the CC survivied the first contact causing hull damages in the port aft side, i.e. floated upright and was stable. The Master and crew didn't panick and evacuated 99% of the passengers that could embark into LSA. Not too bad. The vessel had flooded compartments aft and trimmed on stern as expected.
But then vessel started to heel to starboard. Why that happened is a mystery. Unsymmetrical flooding? How? Why would the vessel start to heel?
And then the ship suddenly capsized as reported by the Master. Luckily the capsize was stopped, when the deckhouse crashed against the beach, so the vessel floated on its side. And then CC sank - as no ship can float on the side.
Why do you think the Costa Concordia capsized? Because the ECR was wrongly located?

 

The answers to all your questions are in my previous posts on this forum - try starting at page 5. I'm only too well aware of FSE - I think we have been in touch with each other in the past on the subject in relation to the 'Glasgow Concept' developed from the loss of the 'Herald of Free Enterprise'.

 

There are only two questions! Why did the Costa Concordia first heel to starboard and then, suddenly (when?), capsize (after being stable/upright for a time after a mysterious side contact)?
There are three Italian expert groups investigating the matter. I wonder what they will conclude.

 

All my information and analysis suggests that, having first heeled to port by virtue of 1 - turn; 2 - impact to port below CG (hardly a mystery!), followed by 3 - loll to port during the initial rapid inflow phase with assymetric load (ie rock), CC returned to the near upright before slowly heeling to starboard - all over a period of 1.25 hours. Just before grounding she had reached 13 degrees to starboard (as I have explained above through progressive flooding of the starboard deck spaces of A and then 0 decks around the flooded engine compartments) from which point the capsize developed from progressive flooding of the starboard spaces over the whole length of the ship. With 5 compartments flooded the starboard heel was technically a progressively developing loll under the influence of large developing free surfaces. The final capsize to 80 degrees or so (which was hardly sudden) was only restrained by contact of the side structure with the rock shelf at which point she stabilised aground and had technically sunk. Had she not run aground she would have stabilised upside down.

The issue, as I have already said quite clearly, is why/how did the flood water in the ER percolate into the starboard portion of A deck with an average flow rate of some 0.4 m3/s? What was/were the breach(es) in the watertight integrity of the deck and/or longitudinal bulkhead and why were they apparently only to starboard when the vessel initially had a slight port list? Find the answer to these questions and the problem is solved!

I only hope there is no 'cover up' during the salvage operation when much useful forensic evidence on this issue could be gleaned. I will also be interested to see what the 'expert groups' and the overall technical investigation will conclude if it is ever published openly.

 

Yes, I agree. Everybody was seasick or wining/dining too much Mediterranean Costa style ... or just sick ... or crazy. That's what crusing all about. Who was at fault. Evidently the ship's Doctor. Looking after the cute dancer's left foot that slipped to port causing ... disaster?