Bourbon Dolphin capsizes

Now we come to the 64000 dollar question

a) Has anybody learn't anything from all this? "Possibly"

b) Will anything 'concrete' be done about it? "doubtful"

c) Does anybody care about those that lost their lives? "the families do, as do fellow seamen of all walks - anybody else ?"

d) In 'c' above - sufficent to ensure the practice is corrected such that it won't happen again - remembering that this will push the price of oil (etc) up - this WILL affect you?! Other than those mentioned in 'c' whose 'shout' is very small, probably not!

And there ladies and gentlemen it stands - a ship has been lost, people have died, an inqiry has been held, blame has been apportioned (not I might add for the real reason). Now life (for most) must be allowed to move on!!

LET IT!!

 

Whats needed is some affirmative action like the guy did whose family was lost in the Swiss air disaster ( totally avoidable midair crash) Swiss air traffic control is and was an accident waiting to happen), he was so pissed off he knocked on the door of the atc guy concerned and shot him.
Unfortunately, although on his watch the problem was caused by the management so a guy died and wasn't really to blame.
The moral of the story is make sure you shoot the right guy (s) in this case

Or in the case of the Erika, put some Total and the Rina guys in prision shooting is a bit harsh although it would sharpen a few minds of people that are paid to ensure the saftey of human lives to actually ensure the saftey of human lives!

 

Discussion on Safety Obligations arising from this incident

Dear all

I agree with Guillermo's observation that there is a natural tendency of parties to avoid accepting responsibility for such an event. It is human nature, especially as there are ethical, moral and financial impacts associated with such admissions.

There are some documents that participants to this group might be relevant to discussions on safety obligations of designers, builder, owners and operators.

Part A of the National Standard for Commercial Vessels contains information on wider safety obligations. You can view Part A at:

http://www.nmsc.gov.au/documents/NSCV/PARTA.PDF

The Preamble to the NSCV states:

Part A

Part A aims to raise the awareness of all parties involved in the design, construction, supply, ownership and operation of commercial vessels of the need to provide for the safety of persons and to work safely. These obligations currently exist under the various State and Territory OH&S Acts and in common law.

Part A does not establish or impose new safety obligations on the industry. It sets out in general terms, information that describes these existing safety obligations in a form relevant to the commercial vessel industry. This information is only for guidance and persons should refer to applicable OH&S and other legislation for details of mandatory requirements.

Part A highlights the wider responsibilities relating to the safety of a commercial vessel that should at all times be considered. Compliance with Parts B to F of the NSCV by itself may not be sufficient to fully discharge these responsibilities, though such compliance should go a long way towards doing so. There is an onus on each party to identify hazards, analyse risks and control risks that are not adequately addressed by the NSCV, given the particular circumstances of the vessel and its operation.

It is important to note that in relation to the NSCV, compliance with Part A is not required in order for a Certificate of Survey to be issued for a vessel, or a Certificate of Competency to be issued to a person.[/INDENT]

When Part A was released, it proved to be a bit of a shock to designers and builders who thought that mere compliance with the standards required for a certificate of survey meant that they would have fulfilled their safety obligations.

A more in-depth conceptual discussion of this topic can be viewed in a paper that I prepared a number of years ago called "The Safety Gap" at:

http://www.nmsc.gov.au/documents/safety_gap.pdf

The reality is that minimum statutory standards will not and cannot cover every aspect of safety. They provide a safety net below which operation of a vessel is unacceptable. Incidents like the Bourbon Dolphin may show that the level set by the safety net was unacceptable and hopefully investigations of incidents are the trigger for such changes.

For the "safety gap" between the minimum required standard and adequate standards, the broader safety obligations mentioned above in Part A of the NSCV can be addressed by industry codes of practice. Such a code had been developed for the

and can be viewed at:

http://www.amsa.gov.au/Shipping_Safety/Codes_Manuals_and_Reports/Offshore_Support_Vessel_Code/

This code states:

10.1.3 STABILITY

10.1.3.1 It is the responsibility of the Master to ensure that the vessel always has adequate stability and at least complies with the minimum requirements of the international conventions at all stages of operations.

10.1.3.2 Regard shall be taken of the possible reduction of stability due to the retention of water in pipe cargoes, heeling effects of a tow-wire under load, discharge of bottom weight at sea or any other factor that may impinge on the stability of the vessel.

10.1.3.3 The Master has the authority to cease or modify an operation if he is of the opinion that it may compromise the stability of the vessel to the extent that the minimum requirements cannot be met at all times.​

While the Code does not provide the technical analysis or criteria to address the problem, it at least reinforces the master's authority to cease or modify an operation. However, it would be wrong to interpret this clause to suggest that the master alone holds ultimate responsibility. Broader safety obligations such as those specified in Part A of the NSCV place responsibility on designers, builders, equipment suppliers, owners and management to support the master in his/her responsibility.

Finally, the new Part C Subsection 6A - Intact Stability Criteria and Subsection 6C - Stability Tests and Stability Information of the National Standard for Commercial vessels contain minimum statutory requirements for stability criteria and stability information required for OSVs.

Regards
Mori​

 

Mori,

Thanks for some excellent information. A question was raised much earlier in this thread that is worth, I believe, raising again. While there appear to be statutory requirements for designers, owners, and operators to assess and confirm stability, at least in the Australian codes you quoted, there is some question regarding the degree of support given by owners and operating companies to the decision of a master to refuse to commence or to terminate early an operation when he deems that safety is being compromised. While anecdotal, there have been several reports of masters who put crew safety above operational schedules being let go or not rehired. I have not seen language in any of the regulations quoted through the history of this thread requiring protection for a master's safety calls. All of the statutes are meaningless in their effect on crew protection if masters can be bullied and threatened to push the limits in the interests of cost savings and maintaining preset schedules.

 

Hi Charlie,

I hope that some of the Commissions recomendations will, in future, close some of the gaps in the safety systems that were obviously not covered on this operation.
Regarding your question about "Masters Safety Calls", I don't wish to be Devil's Advocate, but I think that this vessel was pushed to its limits while all its many defects went unnoticed by the Officers, and some may have been due to them.
The Commision talks about levels of training and the need to have more experienced men on board. In an anchor-handling operation in deep water with heavy loads involved, I would expect, although I am not of that discipline, at least four fully-qualified, anchor-handling experienced, bridge personnel to cover 24 hour working. I don't think that was the case here, in fact, no one on the bridge had a very long track-record in this type of work.
They also did not miss mentioning the poor crew-change handover at Shetland at 5 O'clock in the morning, the worst hour on the clock as anyone who has been on shiftwork can tell you.
I would say that it was bad ship management by Bourbon that was the main cause, not picking up on the new vessels shortcomings and dealing with them, poor crew posting and lack of training for such an important task. The crews action in letting the chain load move to the other side while under a massive athwart-ship tension was the final straw.

 

Murdo,

I think you are, in fact, playing devil's advocate, an honorable role. In general, I concur with your observations. I raised the question of support of a master's decision to back off if he believes it is unsafe precisely because it was raised previously, and because pressure to complete an operation despite worsening weather or unsafe conditions, if enforced by possible career consequences, can affect the judgement of even the most experienced seamen.

I am not implying that this occurred in this instance. The report of the investigative board seems accurate in stating that the disaster was the culmination of a variety of factors. Among them, certainly, is the fact that a crew was tasked with a requirement in which they did not have extensive experience, in a ship which was originally tasked as the support vessel because it was deemed marginal for the role of primary. How and why the change in assignment from support to primary was made was a key element.

I raised the question of master's safety calls again because it was raised previously in the context of a belief by some officers of OSV's that safety calls that cost big money could have negative career consequences. There was pressure to complete the operation as soon as possible. What would have been the result if BD's captain said he was aborting the operation?

I would hope there will be documented procedures to both discourage frivolous safety calls and support the masters in the case of valid ones.

 

Hi Again, Charlie

The towmaster/company rep. (one man doing two key jobs) kept repeating at the inquiry that the vessel captain could abort the job if he felt he had to. "He could hardly say anything else" we can say, but he was right about that point at least.

In the oil industry there are lots of people who will ask you to do the most stupid things to get things done quicker. Sometimes they will even try and interfere with your work in their frenzy to prove themselves. When you are experienced enough, you learn how to deal with them and put them in their place. I have often been handed over tasks from in-experienced supervisors that were suicidal. One guy wanted to do a 15000 psi hydrostatic test through a 4" 10000 psi hose because he could not wait for a helicopter to bring out blinds rated for the pressure. The engineer was going to let him do it. When I called a halt nobody argued with me, they couldn't.

Three weeks ago an oil company man removed an untested section of pipework from one of our fabricators shops and had it driven 30 miles to the ship he wanted it on. My Quality Control colleague had to threaten him with being up on a major breach of company procedures if he did not bring it back. They don't plan their work in time and are rushing about at the last minute trying to beat the clock.

I am sure that the captains can make the safety call as well but, like the rest of us, it is a matter of gaining confidence, through experience, so that you are sure of your ground and not afraid to speak up.

 

Totally agree Charlie, as you know having worked as Master on these vessels that the pressures put on you to keep working despite heavy misgivings are very heavy indeed! I personally as Mate in the old days can remember at least three occasions where I have pulled the men off the deck stating quite catorgorically that conditions were unsafe and we WOULD NOT WORK ON DECK! Yes the Master did on each occasion receive all sorts of threats from the rig which I do believe would have eventually resulted in him returning to work and injuring somebody, but for my stand!! I have also told the rig that my men would not under any circumstances go back on deck until I thought it was safe!! Yes I go stick and changed jobs occasionally (actually I moved around the same company a lot - the 'office' did not agree with the way I did things but they knew I was right!). I might like to add that in those days the Mate actually worked on deck rather than on the bridge - if anybody was going to get it hurt it was me!! (especially during anchor handling) I still remember the conversation were it was mentioned that seven guys had been killed on North Sea AHTS's in a six week period - six of them were Mates!!)


Concentrated the mind wonderfully!!

Also of course, as here, there is the degree of experience involved, all the old Anchor Handlers are either dead or ashore! the new ones, as in the old days are doing a good job but like everyone else, experience has to be earned and there is only one way to do it!! You can't get experience out of a book!

THAT is the duty of the shipowner to ensure that all his men have the experience - or are placed with those who do!!

 

Dear Charlie

Yes, it is a difficult point that you raise. While in theory one might have the authority to pull the pin on an activity, the reality is that 'whistle blowers' can and do get ostracised for doing their job. This not only happens to masters on vessels, but also to other professionals including engineers, nurses, etc.

The maritime area is particularly polarised in this regard. A look at Australian legislation will show that most provisions place legal liability for breaches on the master of a vessel, a hangover from the days when the operation of the vessel was autonomous from head office. However, there is a growing recognition that such legislation is too restrictive and does not deal with the root cause of a lot of safety problems which is the company culture that is driven by senior management.

A very sad example of the problem was the Herald of Free Enterprise incident. While the directors of the company were not convicted (see below), they were prosecuted which in itself is a wake-up call.

A similar problem has been identified in road transport where the driver was held responsible. I understand that the road transport laws in Australia have been reformed to widen the net so that directors of transport companies can also be in breach of the legislation. It is quite likely that future reform of maritime laws in Australia will consider the approach taken for road transport.

Finally there is the impact of OH&S law. The following comes from "The Safety Gap" paper that I mentioned in my earlier message.

"The standards safety gap is an issue of importance for senior management of a company, be it a company of designers, builders, suppliers, owners or operators. There have been a number of reforms in OH&S legislation in Australia to lift the corporate veil that helps protect the senior management of a company from being personnally held accountable for the safety breaches of the company. Furthermore, there have been recent attempts to introduce corporate manslaughter as a specfic crime in the criminal code (v).
To date, convictions of company directors and managers under criminal law for failure to take appropriate steps to protect the health and safety of persons have been difficult. For instance, consider the capsize of the ferry Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 that caused the death of 192 persons. An attempt to prosecute two directors of P&O Ferries for manslaughter failed. The problem lay in establishing within the corporate structure who was the ‘controlling mind’ in the company responsible for the act or failure. Subsequent cases indicate that the smaller the company, the easier it is to prove direct responsibility of individual directors or managers (vi).

"However, changes to OH&S legislation and continued pressure for changes to the criminal code are putting senior management on notice as to their responsibilities for managing the standards safety gap. For example, Section 26 of the NSW OH&S Act states—

26 Offences by corporations—liability of directors and managers
(1) If a corporation contravenes, whether by act or omission, any provision of this Act or regulations, each director of the corporation, and each person concerned in the management of the corporation, is taken to have contravened the same provision unless the director or person satisfies the court that:

(a) he or she was not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in relation to its contavention of the provisions, or

(b) he or she, being in such a position, used all due diligence to prevent the
contravention by the corporation.

"In relation to these defences, the Chief Industrial Magistrate in NSW has commented that it will be extremely difficult for an employer to establish a defence where it has not in place a comprehensive occupational health and safety program and risk management program which is applied to the given task. (vii).


Regards
Mori

 

Not only in Australia, but the whole world around, I think.
We just write at the stability books the phrase you posted:
"It is the responsibility of the Master to ensure that the vessel always has adequate stability and at least complies with the minimum requirements of the international conventions at all stages of operations."
or the like, and there it goes all responsibility over the Master's backs (And if he dies in the accident, then he becomes the perfect 'pim-pam-pum' shooting target).

I think its time to bring responsibilities also to owning companies' directors, naval architects, surveyors and regulatory body's officers.

Cheers.

 

Guys, I havent seen this posted, dated 2nd April

http://www.shippingtimes.co.uk/itm167_bourbon-dolphin.htm

Ulstein defends BOURBON DOLPHIN design

Vessel exposed to more difficult conditions than it was designed for, says CEO...

Ulstein Group, the designers and builders of the tragic BOURBON DOLPHIN which capsized last year with the loss of eight lives, have issued a statement defending the design of the vessel.

“The Commission of Inquiry has done a thorough job after being given the important and difficult job of identifying the reasons for the capsizing and sinking of the Bourbon Dolphin on April 12 last year. We feel that the report is comprehensive and detailed in many areas. The Commission points to a series of related circumstances acting together to cause the loss of the Bourbon Dolphin,” says Ulstein Group Deputy CEO Tore Ulstein.

This follows criticism from the Norwegian inquiry which reported last week. The inquiry held that there were a number of factors involving all parties that led to the tragedy, including: "The anchor-handling conditions prepared by the shipyard were not realistic...Nor did the Norwegian Maritime Directorate’s regulatory system make any requirement that these be approved.”

Tore Ulstein said, “Ulstein Verft has followed all of the applicable rules and stipulations in the building of the ship, and we see that the Commission’s conclusions did not put forward any recommendations for changes to the existing regulations. It is clear from the report that there are not any faults in the design of the ship. The vessel was exposed to more difficult conditions than it was designed for.”

Responding to the inquiry's questioning whether stability challenges were not sufficiently communicated from the shipyard to the ship-owner, he said,

“Ulstein delivered an approved stability manual with examples of realistic conditions. In such a manual it isn’t possible to provide an exhaustive list of conditions, as that would make the guide too comprehensive. Current conditions outside of those that are specified in the stability manual shall be calculated manually on board the ship. This includes not least anchor handling. A tool that can help the crew with this task is the load calculator that was installed onboard. Here the crew can enter the relevant conditions into the calculator at any point in time, and then receive an immediate answer back,” says Tore Ulstein.

On the question of the ship not have sufficient stability under the given loading conditions the CEO responded:

“This would have been the case for every ship, and it was also a fact here. When a ship’s limitations are exceeded, there can be fatal consequences

“The rationale of having a load calculator onboard is so that one can in advance calculate and be attentive of alternating extreme loads that the ship is exposed to under demanding marine operations.

“Ulstein will continue to carry out our work on our ships with a high degree of safety and security. Even before the accident took place Ulstein took part in a research project involving demanding marine operations together with other serious actors in the maritime cluster, as an element of our continuous focus on safety in such operations. This work has lead to additional reinforcements in the aftermath of the tragic accident,” he says.

 

As usual after any tragedy there are no shortage of people pointing fingers. I would be willing to bet money that the stability calculator would state that the vessel had a positive GM.

I am still curious what, if any, work has been done to see how an anchor handling vessel is effected when getting pulled astern. I believe that this would have a tremendous negative impact on stability as soon as deck immersion is achieved.

-Chuck

 

I'd love to have a look to the stability manual, to check out these words, as the designer should have studied not only the minimum IMO conditions, but any other foreseeable for the operation of the vessel, specially those posing a risk. And it's also mandatory to clearly specify within the 'Captain instructions' which are the expected limits. Was this done? Mr. Ulstein explicitly recognizes anchor handling was not considered, which is most surprising and poor practice, from my point of veiw.

Risking myself to be unfair, it sounds to me the kind of statement just to shake the responsibility off one's back.

Cheers.

 

It's all very well stating that the man on the spot should have this system and that system and the other system with which to work out this, that and t'other! But he's only one man doing about ten different jobs, all at the same time and as we know (not just in anchor handling) when it goes wrong it goes wrong dramatically, and quickly!! The second man on the bridge is invariably under training somewhat - we all have to start somewhere!

And now you want to give him MORE work!! Yeah right!!

Chuck I guess we can both answer that question - a lot of zero's are involved! And as we know once you get water on deck, especially from astern over the roller (which of course must be low to enable work to be carried out) things go 'down hill rapidly' (no pun intended) and as more water comes in it increases, especially, as here, your tied to the rig and can't get out of it easily!!

 

I like your previous comments about the Master catching the blame, Guillermo - they are most definitly the case in the BD.

I feel like they should say that the vessel master has the authority to release the tail of any man-eating tiger he has in his possession. It is easy to write on paper - but damned tough to do without getting eaten.
--Chuck