Bourbon Dolphin capsizes

That's it. From displacement and period GM was derived.
The heave function was intended to determine the mean waves height and so inform the captain if sea conditions were exceeding those for which the boat was conceived.
The program was a development of an already existing one (from the same company) needing to manually introduce the load condition, which is not realistic for small fishing vessels. The heave analysis proved to be a major task and developing stopped there. But the draught-period thing was solved and it's a real pity the program didn't come to a complete development, as the expected price for the commercial version was very attractive even for very small boats.

Cheers.

 

I dont know what type of heave sensors you tried, but the heave, roll and pitch sensors we have fitted for the dynamic positioning system are very expensive. Had one burn out when the internal back up battery leaked, cost of replacement was something in the region of $16,000!!.
Best regards
Nigel

 

I have a question about stability tanks - I know that there was some concern over these following some fishing vessel incidents in Alaska. Wasn't there a rule proposal requiring the quick dumping of these either overboard or to a lower centerline tank? I remember reading something about this but could not remember the details.

The CRFs just mention the requirements for calculating stability, but do not even mention the use of passive roll reduction tanks anywhere else in the CFRs (that I have been able to find)

http://law.justia.com/us/cfr/title46/46-7.0.1.2.5.9.59.3.html

What are the thoughts about 'quick' dump valves on these tanks? Are these required in other flag states? It seems like it could be a way to quickly increase the GM of a vessel.

I have never had the pleasure of working on a vessel with passive roll reduction tanks (crew comfort never seems to be very high on the vessel design criteria on vessels I work on). This one I am currently on always has around an 8 second roll period for most load conditions. That makes it hard to keep the coffee cup on the table during rough weather.

--Chuck

 

The Heritage Service (and others of her class) is one that I know of that had the quick dump valves fitted, a mate told me that they could dump the tank contents in about 20secs by opening both valves, she was operating under a FOC (Belize or Vanuatu) when I last saw her, but when new she operated in northern candian waters I think.

 

I just heard on the lunchtime news that the enquiry report is being delayed by at least two months. It should have been complete in early February.

 

Prelimanary Report has now been published

http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2061386/PDFS/NOU200820080008000EN_PDFS.pdf

Nigel

 

Thanks for the link, Nigel.

Best regards
Johannpeter

 

Thanks a lot, Nigel.

 

"Key conclusions are:

• The vessel was built and equipped as an all-round vessel AHSV (Anchor Handling Supply Vessel). Uniting these functions poses special challenges.
In addition to bollard pull, anchor-handling demands thruster capacity, powerful winches, big drums and equipment for handling chain. Supply and cargo operations demand the biggest possible, and also flexible, cargo capacities both on deck and in tanks. The “Bourbon Dolphin” was a relatively small and compact vessel, in which all these requirements were to be united.

• The company had no previous experience with the A 102 design and ought therefore to have undertaken more critical assessments of the vessel’s
characteristics, equipment and not least operational limitations, both during her construction and during her subsequent operations under various conditions. The company did not pick up on the fact that the vessel had experienced an unexpected stability-critical incident about two months after delivery.

• The vessel’s stability-related challenges were not clearly communicated from shipyard to company and onwards to those who were to operate the vessel.

• Under given load conditions the vessel did not have sufficient stability to handle lateral forces. The winch’s pulling-power was over-dimensioned in
relation to what the vessel could in reality withstand as regards stability.

• The anchor-handling conditions prepared by the shipyard were not realistic. Nor did the Norwegian Maritime Directorate’s regulatory system make any requirement that these be approved.

• The ISM Code demands procedures for the key operations that the vessel is to perform, Despite the fact that anchor-handling was the vessel’s main function, there was no vessel-specific anchor-handling procedure for the “Bourbon Dolphin”.

• The company did not follow the ISM code’s requirement that all risk be identified.

• The company did not make sufficient requirements for the crew’s qualifications for demanding operations. The crew’s lack of experience was not compensated for by the addition of experienced personnel.

• The master was given 1½ hours to familiarise himself with the crew and vessel and the ongoing operation. In its safety management system the company has a requirement that new crews shall be familiarised with (inducted into) the vessel before they can take up their duties on board. In practice the master familiarises himself by overlapping with another master who knows the vessel, before he himself is given the command.

• Neither the company nor the operator ensured that sufficient time was made available for hand-over in the crew change.

• The vessel was marketed with continuous bollard pull of 180 tonnes. During an anchor-handling operation, in practice thrusters are always used for manoeuvring and dynamic positioning. The real bollard pull is then materially reduced. The company did not itself investigate whether the vessel was suited to the operation, but left this to the master.

• The company did not see to the acquisition of information about the content and scope of the assignment the “Bourbon Dolphin” was set to carry out. The company did not itself do any review of the Rig Move Procedure (RMP) with a view to risk exposure for crew and vessel. The company was thus not in a position to offer guidance.

• The Norwegian classification society Det norske Veritas (DNV) and the Norwegian Maritime Directorate were unable to detect the failures in the company’s systems though their audits.

• In specifying the vessel, the operator did not take account of the fact that the real bollard pull would be materially reduced through use of thrusters. In practice the “Bourbon Dolphin” was unsuited to dealing with the great forces to which she was exposed.

• The mooring system and the deployment method chosen were demanding to handle and vulnerable in relation to environmental forces.

• Planning of the RMP was incomplete. The procedure lacked fundamental and concrete risk assessments. Weather criteria were not defined and the forces were calculated for better weather conditions than they chose to operate in. Defined safety barriers were lacking. It was left to the discretion of the rig and the vessels whether operations should start or be suspended.

• In advance of the operation no start-up meeting with all involved parties was held. The vessels did not receive sufficient information about what could be expected of them, and the master misunderstood the vessel’s role.

• The procedure demanded the use of two vessels that had to operate at close quarters in different phases during the recovery and deployment of anchors.

• The increased risk exposure of the vessels was not reflected in the procedure. The procedure lacked provisions for alternative measures (contingency planning), for example in uncontrollable drifting from the run-out line. Nor were there guidelines for when and in what way such alternative measures should be implemented and what if any risk these would involve.

• The deployment of anchor no. 2 was commenced without the considerable drifting during the deployment of the diagonal anchor no. 6 had been evaluated.

• Human error on the part of the rig and the vessels during the performance of the operation.

• Communication and coordination between the rig and the vessel was defective during the last phase of the operation.

• Lack of involvement on the part of the rig when the “Bourbon Dolphin” drifted.

• The roll reduction tank was most probably in use at the time of the accident.

• The inner starboard towing pin had been depressed and the chain was lying against the outer starboard towing pin. The chain thereby acquired a changed
angle of attack."


WOW!

 

Norway has a MNP system of voting(or it did)
In their parliament, decisions are worked through sensibly with no shouting, for as long as it takes to come to concensus
It seems to me. and I am only part way through the findings, that this commitee has an attitude that comes across same way., calm factual , unjudgemental, no hoopla, stroking of egos, professional
i will savor it, like a story, taking time,
It should be interesting to compare the (findings) of our members to the findings of the enquiry

 

Nigel,

Thank you for posting the link to the report.

While I have no firsthand knowledge of Norwegian parliamentary conduct, I agree with Stuart's impression of the tone of the report as expressed in the key conclusions. The report is professional and investigatory in tone; listing facts and conditions as they have been revealed. From the number of items listed in the key conclusions, it is apparent that this has been a thorough investigation.

No more comments until I've read the entire document.

 

http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/jd...the-loss-of-the-bourbon-dolphi.html?id=505100

 

Are the underwater photos of the wreck available somewhere? It is said that they were made in December 2007.

Regards
Johannpeter

 

The commision is a mix of engineers and lawers.
From http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/NOUer/2008/nou-2008-8/4.html?id=504452


2.2 Commision members details


Inger Lyng
Cand jur 1976 (studied law)
Experience as a judge and from the justice department and the police

Guro Høyaas Løken
Master of Science, Marin Teknikk, NTNU, Trondheim 1996 – Hydrodynamics and marine structures
Experience from
Aker Marine Contractors AS, Marin Ingeniør, 1997–1998, CSO Aker Engineering/Technip Inc, Houston, Senior Specialist, 1998–2002, Aker Marine Contractors Inc. Houston, Principal Naval Architect, 2002–2005, ..., Marine Works Manager og Engineering manager.


Gisle Arnold Hansen Fiksdal
Sivilingeniør (Msc), NTH, Trondheim 1984
Experence from MARINTEK as a scientist 1986-2001, owner and manager of Lodic AS, developing software for hydristatics and stability – Shipshape
Stability books for ships, load calculatorr, ShipLoad

Dag Andreassen
Skipsførereksamen 1981 (captain)
DNV Incident Investigation Training
ExxonMobil Risk Analysis Training Level II
Marinspesialist ExxonMobil 1987- 2008:
1973-1987: Practical experience from offshore-operasjoner.


Yngve Skovly
Cand. jur 1988 (studied law)
Worked as a judge and in the police


Terje Hernes Pettersen
Cand jur 1996
Master of Law 1997
worked in Norwegian Maritime Directorate and department of comerce
member of "Skipssikkerhetslovutvalget" (Ships safety laws commision)



Sorry for my English, but you probably understand, it's a lot of relevant experience in this group.

 

It's good to see that an experienced Master was actually on the investigation committee - quite often they aren't, which does give a false impression at times as (as all sailors of every type - commercial, fishing and yachtsmen) know what happens at sea can at times be completely different to the theory!

This does look like a well organised investigation (as one would expect from the Norwegians) and whilst some of the comments are as expected I will reserve judgement until I've read the complete report!